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THE COVERAGE OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS
ACT AND OTHER PROBLEMS IN ITS
INTERPRETATION
FR-AN E. CoopEa*
Broad responsibilities of statutory interpretation and administrative interpolation
are imposed on the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor in de-
termining the coverage of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. Two principal
factors (interesting in themselves as examples of legislative technique) contribute to
this end: first, use of elastic, vague, and broadly inclusive language in the provisions
affirmatively establishing the coverage; second, delegation to an Administrator of the
power to define the meaning of certain generic terms employed in those sections of
the Act which establish exclusions and exemptions.
The result has been chiefly to generate doubts and uncertainty. But some cold
comfort can be derived from the circumstance that at least one question as to the
coverage of the Act can be answered with certainty. When an employer inquires
whether the wage and hour requirements of the law apply to his business, an attorney
can with comparative safety always answer in the negative. The fundamental in-
quiry in the determination of the coverage of the Act is not the nature of the
employer's business, but the nature of the job of each employee. Many employers
find that some of their employees are within the Act, while others are excluded.1 If
an employee is engaged in interstate commerce, or in a job which is necessary to the
production 2 of goods for interstate commerce, he is entitled to the benefits of the Act,
unless he falls within one of the exempted classes,3 or unless his employer cannot
constitutionally be compelled to grant him such benefits.4
In this article, an examination will be made of the content of the two phrases
"engaged in commerce" and "engaged in the production [or in a process necessary to
the production] of goods for commerce." A brief analysis of the several partial and
*A.B., 1931, J. D., 1934, University of Michigan. Member of the Detroit, Michigan, bar, associated
with Beautmont, Smith & Hani. Contributor to legal periodicals.
' Why Congress in the enactment of this Act thus. changed the usual test is a matter of considerable
speculative interest. It seems likely, however, that the chief purpose was to avoid certain problems relative
to the constitutional validity of the Act, and all such questions are excluded from the scope of this article.2 The Act employs primarily the phrase "engaged in production," but the Act further provides that
an employee is deemed to be engaged in the production of goods if he is engaged in any process necessary
to the production thereof.
a These are discussed in some detail, infra, pp. 343-350.
'Constitutional issues are discussed in a separate article in this symposium. For other discussions, see(939) 52 H-v. L. Rav. 645; Cooper, "Extra Time for Overtime" Now Law (1938) 37 MICH. L. Ray. 28.
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total exemptions will be undertaken; and reference will be had, finally, to certain
practical problems centering around the terms "wage"5 and "regular rate of pay"' in
connection with the substantive requirement of the Act that covered employees be
paid, for overtime work, at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular
rate of pay at which they are employed7 While any complete investigation of these
problems necessarily would involve consideration of certain of the constitutional
issues raised by the Act, these questions will not be here considered.
Broad though the powers of the Administrator are in determining the coverage,
they are not so complete as was provided in some of the early drafts of the wage and
hour bill,8 under which the Administrator would have been empowered, first, to
make investigations to determine which industries were so closely related to the flow
of interstate commerce as to be subject to federal control and, secondly, to decide
what the minimum wage and maximum hour requirements should be as to par-
ticular industries. Congress saw fit to reduce the scope of administrative freedom by
limitations at once important and indefinite; and because of this, the implementation
of the Act by the Administrator affords many interesting examples of the workings
of the administrative process in filling in the interstices of a rather loosely knit legis-
lative fabric.
Where power is delegated to the Administrator to make regulations (as in the
section authorizing employment at substandard wages of learners, apprentices, mes-
sengers, and handicapped workers under certificates, 9 and in the section requiring
the Administrator to define certain exempted classes'°), he has published detailed
rules closely conforming in style to legislative enactments. Where such power is not
delegated, however, the Administrator has drawn on a variety of sources as a means
of publicizing and seeking popular acceptance of his interpretation of ambiguous or
obscure provisions of the Act." A number of Interpretative Bulletins have been
issued, drafted on the whole in persuasive rather than decretal language, interpreting
sections of the Act which the Administrator does not have power to particularize
through the medium of regulations.' 2 Information dealing with less controversial
questions as to coverage is disseminated through the medium of published Questions
and Answers, designed to enable employers unskilled in reading legislative language
to appreciate by example the meaning of many of the provisions of the Act and of
regulations issued thereunder relating to coverage. 18 Finally, in opinions of counsel
§3 (m). 6 §7 (a). 7 ibid.
' See Forsythe, Legislative History of the Fair Labor Standards Act, infra, p. 464.
9 §14. 20 §13.
' One of the features of the administration of the law has been the commendable effort to elicit
popular co-operation.
"'It should be noted that the Administrator has carefully pointed out, in published releases, that he
has not been empowered to pass on the questions so discussed; and that the final answers are for the
courts. The bulletins state what interpretation will be followed by the administrative officers unless the
courts impose on them a different rule of practice or unless on reconsideration the administrative ruling is
danged.
" These releases have been accompanied by the warning that each answer has been made on the basis
of the particular circumstances involved, and that the answers should not be construed as covering cases
that might be regarded as similar.
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and public addresses, the administrative officials have sought to create a widespread
acceptance of the liberal interpretation of the Act favored by the Administrator.
References to illustrative instances of the employment of these techniques will be
made hereinafter. They possess a distinct advantage in that, because of their semi-
official nature, they can be used to suggest interpretations which, if issued in the form
of regulations, might be invalid as going beyond the statute under which they were
promulgated.14
I. EMPLOYEES ENGAGED IN INTEPSTATE COMMERCE
Uncertainty as to the implications of recent Supreme Court decisions15 renders
doubtful predictions as to the comprehensiveness of the apparently simple phrase in-
cluding within the provisions of the Act employees "engaged in commerce."16 Cer-
tainly included are workers engaged in the operation of the instrumentalities of
interstate commerce. The typical case would be members of a train crew, or wireless
operators.17 But what is to be said of the "back shop" employees-those who do not
come into direct contact with the actual movement of commerce? A ready analogy
is found in decisions construing the provisions of the Federal Employers' Liability
Act,' S under which only those employees who were engaged in interstate transporta-
tion were deemed to be included within similar language.19 If the phrase "engaged
in commerce" be again construed to mean "engaged in transportation," the problem
would be greatly simplified; but since the decisions setting up this definition appear
to be founded in part at least on doubts as to the constitutionality of including within
the Federal Employers' Liability Act employees who were not engaged in transpor-
tation, and since later decisions go some distance toward erasing these doubts,20 it
may well be argued that in passing upon the Fair Labor Standards Act the courts
will feel free to ignore this restrictive interpretation and hold that employees whose
work is essential to the smooth operation of instrumentalities of commerce are them-
selves engaged in commerce, even though their contact with interstate movement of
commodities or intelligence is only indirect. Conceding jural freedom to broaden the
concept of the phrase "engaged in commerce," however, can it not properly be argued
that Congress, in choosing to re-employ language which had been judicially con-
1
"' For cases invalidating regulations of administrative agencies on this ground, see: Campbell v. Long
& Co., 281 U. S. 61o (1930); Morrill v. Jones, io6 U. S. 466 (1882); United States v. Symonds, 120
U. S. 46 (z887); United States v. Eaton, i44 U. S. 677 (1892); United States v. United Verde Copper
Co., x96 U. S. 207 (igo5); United States v. George, 228 U. S. 14 (1913).
" Particularly Mulford v. Smith, 59 Sup. Ct. 648 (1939); Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor
Relations Board, 305 U. S. 197 (1938); Santa Cruz Packing Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 303
U. S. 453 (1938); National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1 (1937).
'1 §§6(a), 7(a).
"Many such employees are exempted from the hours provisions by §13(b), referring to (a) any
employee with respect to whom the Interstate Commerce Commission has power to establish qualifications
and maximum hours of service pursuant to the provisions of §204 of the Motor Carrier Act, (b) any
employee of an employer subject to the provisions of Part I of the Interstate Commerce Act.
is 35 STAT. 65 (1908), 45 U. S. C. §51 (1934).
" Shanks v. Delaware, L. & NV. R. R., 239 U. S. 556 (1916); New York, N. H. & H. R. R. v. Bezue,
284 U. S. 415 (1932).0 See cases cited in (939) 52 HAy. L. Rav. 646, at 651, 652.
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
strued, must be held to have intended adoption of such construction? If Congress
intended to include employees who would be excluded by defining "engaged in com-
merce" as "engaged in transportation," why did not the draftsmen provide that the
Act should apply to all employees whose work "directly or substantially affects"
commerce ?21
Quite properly, all of these doubts have been resolved by the Administrator's
general counsel in favor of a broad interpretation of the Act. As was stated in an
early Interpretative Bulletin :22
"The first category of workers included,-those 'engaged in (interstate) commerce,'
applies, typically but not exclusively, to employees in the telephone, telegraph, radio and
transportation industries since these industries serve as the actual instrumentalities and
channels of interstate commerce. Employees who are an essential part of the stream of
interstate commerce are also included in the phrase 'engaged in commerce'; for example-
employees of a warehouse whose storage facilities are used in the interstate distribution of
goods."
The reference above made to the "stream-of-commerce" cases as authority for the
inclusion of employees not directly engaged in interstate commerce is illustrative of
the facility with which those charged with the administrative interpretation of the
Act find support for broad interpretation thereof in somewhat unexpected sources.
Similarly, the general counsel has suggested2 3 that since a corporation is held not to
be doing business within a state (so as to subject itself to the statutory penalties
applicable to unlicensed foreign corporations) by installing in a factory therein
mechanical equipment sold in an interstate transaction, it should follow that em-
ployees engaged in such installation are engaged in commerce, and not in a local
activity. Since the decisions in question2 4 are commonly referred to as being based on
the theory that a state may not prohibit a local activity which is intimately associated
with an interstate transaction, the opinion referred to may fairly be characterized as
an interpretation that a worker engaged in local activity intimately associated with
interstate commerce is ipso facto engaged in interstate commerce. A more compre-
hensive interpretation of the phrase could scarcely be desired by the most ardent
champions of work-sharing. 2r On the other hand, the Administrator recognizes the
dangers inherent in a ruthlessly logical application of a rule thus formulated, and
concedes that employees whose direct contact with the actual movement of commerce
is slight should perhaps be excluded from the operative effect of the Act for purely
practical reasons.
2
1 It is on this theory that the federal power has been held to extend to at least some aspects of the
activities of these "back shop" employees. Virginian Ry. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U. S. 515
(1937).22 Wage & Hour Div., Interpr. Bull. No. 1, Oct. 12, 1938, 1 WAGE & HouR REP. MAN. (1939) 72.
25 Letter opinion, published in mimeographed form through the Wage and Hour Division's mailing
list. (1939) 2 WAGE & HouR REP. xx; id. at 72.
"' E.g., York Mfg. Co. v. Colley, 247 U. S. 21 (1918).
" It would seem that the effect of the Act is as much to encourage the sharing of work as to require
payment of wages conformable to a desirable standard of living. See Cooper. supra note 4, at 3!.
2 In a mimeographed release, No. R-207, Feb. 28, 1939, published as a commentary on Interpretative
Bulletins Nos. 5 and 6, it is stated: "This Division has not expressed any opinion as to whether any or all
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It seems reasonably predictable that administrative interpretation will include
within the category of employees "engaged in commerce" all those whose connection
with interstate activities is sufficiently intimate that Congressional regulation of their
employment can be validated under the doctrine that the federal power extends to
local activities directly or substantially affecting commerce. It is not unlikely that
this view may ultimately be judicially accepted. 27 Coverage will probably extend not
only to those actually employed in interstate transportation or communication, but
to extra-state purchasing agents, 28 to employees engaged in the actual unloading of
goods received from other states,29 at least where the continuity of shipment has not
been broken by prolonged delay,3 0 and possibly to other employees whose activities
are closely connected with interstate transactions.
II. EMPLOYEES ENGAGED IN THE PRODUCTION OF GOODS FOR COMMERCE
Most employees entitled to the benefits of the Act can claim rights thereunder
because of their inclusion in the class of those "engaged in the production of goods
for commerce." Consideration of the coverage of this clause can conveniently be
divided into two inquiries: first, what employees are "engaged in production";
second, how is it to be determined whether the goods produced are "goods for
commerce"?
A. Employees Engaged in Production
Suppose a candy manufacturing concern maintains a company car and employs
a chauffeur who is paid thirty-five dollars a week and who is required to be on duty
from eight until six o'clock five days a week to drive company officials on business
calls. Is he engaged in the production of candy (and entitled to extra pay because he
is on duty more than 44 hours a week)? The Wage and Hour Division would say
"yes." 3' Whether this interpretation of the Act is correct involves one of the most
important and difficult problems of statutory construction arising in connection with
the Wage and Hour Law.
The difficulty arises by reason of the statutory definition of the word "produced,"
which is declared to mean32 "produced, manufactured, mined, handled, or in any
other manner worked on in any State" [note that each suggested synonym requires
physical contact between employee and the article of manufacture] "and for the
purposes of this Act an employee shall be deemed to have been engaged in the
production of goods if such employee was employed in producing, manufacturing,
mining, handling, transporting, or in any other manner working on such goods, or
in any process or occupation necessary to the production thereof, .. :
of the employees of small telephone exchanges, which transmit interstate long distance calls very infre-
quently, are engaged in commerce." In Bulletins 5 and 6, the suggestions as to the meaning of this phrase
were so broad as to imply that coverage of all switch board operators was assumed.
'
7 See discussion, (1939) 52 Hxv. L. REv. 645, at 653.
as Krueger v. Acme Fruit Co., 75 F. (2d) 67 (C. C. A. 5th, '935).
2 Puget Sound Stevedoring Co. v. State Tax Commission, 302 U. S. 90 (1939).
"
0 Lehigh Valley R. R. v. Barlow, 244 U. S. 183 (1917).
"'See Interpr. Bull. No. 13, May 3, 1939, P. 3- " §3(j).
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Were it not for the last phrase, italicized by the writer, the provisions of the Act
would be applicable only to those workers actually handling the goods. The avail-
ability of this phrase, however, has enabled the Wage and Hours Division to take
the position that substantially all employees of a plant which manufactures goods
are themselves engaged in the production thereof. In an early Interpretative
Bulletin,33 it was declared, after quoting Section 3(J) of the Act:
"Therefore, the benefits of the statute are extended to such employees as maintenance
workers, watchmen, clerks, stenographers, messengers, all of whom must be considered as
engaged in processes or occupations 'necessary to the production' of the goods. Enterprises
cannot operate without employees of these kinds. If they were not doing work 'necessary
to the production' of the goods they would not be on the payroll."
The correctness of this interpretation of the law is open to serious doubts. Con-
ceding that "enterprises cannot operate without employees of these kinds," does it
follow that production could not proceed without such employees? It would seem
not; and if it be true that production could proceed unimpaired even though the jobs
of a company chauffeur (or, say, a clerk mailing out advertising matter) were
eliminated, how can it be said that the chauffeur or the clerk are engaged in processes
necessary to the production of the goods? The theory that all employees are doing
work necessary to production because the enterprise could not be successfully operated
without them contains elements of non sequitur.
More substantial objections can be raised to the propriety of this administrative
interpretation of the Act. Since the statutory definition of "produced" requires phys-
ical contact with goods, and since the statutory description of "employees engaged in
production" is stated subordinately to the definition of "produced," it can properly
be suggested that the definition of "produced" is controlling, and that the significance
of subsequent clauses in the same sentences4 should be determined with reference
to the introductory words. The second phrase of Section 3(j) should not be construed
to enlarge the first; it is difficult to consider an employee to be "engaged in produc-
tion" under this section unless his work is "production" as therein defined.
The inclusion within the phrase "engaged in production" of all employees en-
gaged in an occupation necessary to production should be considered also with
reference to court decisions apparently recognizing the distinction here suggested
between processes necessary to the operation of an enterprise and those necessary to
production. 5
If the draftsmen of the Conference Committee intended, by shifting the criterion
from the nature of the employer's business to the character of the work performed
by an individual employee, 36 to find a new and broader basis for justifying federal
" Interpr. Bull. No. 1, Oct. 12, 1938, I WAbE & Houn REF. MAN. (939) 72.
"' The definition of "engaged in production" appears in Section 3(j) is a posterior conjunctive clause
in the sentence defining "produced."
"Maryland Casualty Co. v. W. C. Robertson Co., 194 S. W. 1140 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917); New
Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. State Industrial Commission, 8o Okl. 7, 193 Pac. 974 (x920); Thurman v.
Swisshelm, 36 F (2d) 350 (C. C. A. 7th, 1929); McMullin v. Bodine, 247 Pa. 151, 93 Ad. 32! (1915).
"6 Other statutes, of course, are based on the theory of the power of Congress to regulate employers
whose enterprises substantially affect commerce. The words "production of goods for commerce" were
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regulation of local activities,37 it may be that an interpretation which in effect reverts
to the nature of the employer's business will cut out from under the Act its supporting
constitutional props.
It is also worth noting that somewhat similar language in the Walsh-Ijealey Act,
which provides wage and hours standards as to employees of employers engaged
in the performance of government contracts, has been contrarily interpreted by
another Division of the Department of Labor, under which the Fair Labor Standards
Act is administered 3 s
The importance of the problem is seen best by brief reference to its practical
implications. Letters of inquiry and protest addressed to the Wage and Hours
Division attest eloquently to the difficulty of paying time and a half for overtime to
office workers employed on a weekly salary,3 9 to watchmen,40 and to other classes
of non-productive workers paid a weekly salary for, say, a work-week of 45 hours.4 1
So great, indeed, are the practical difficulties which have resulted from the Division's
first sweeping pronouncement, that the matter is apparently being reconsidered by
the Division, and some recession from its original position is not to be unexpected.42
While considerations of administrative convenience,43 as well as the desire to at-
substituted in the Conference Report for the words "affecting commerce," which were used in the House
amendment. 83 CoNG. REc. 9246 (1938).
"' It may be argued, for example, that the productive effort of any single worker has substantially the
same effect on the flow of commerce regardless of the size of the plant in which he is employed, and that
therefore minimum wages can be required for the benefit of a worker in a small plant doing chiefly an
intra-state business, even though his employer's business, as such, is not subject to Congressional control.
See Cooper, supra note 4, at 40, note 47.
"s See Art. 102, Regulations Issued Pursuant to the Walsh-Healey Act. C. C. H. Lab. Law Serv.
73o.12, 7305.051. Comparable are the regulations issued under sales tax laws in various states defining
the meaning of an exemption in favor of sales for consumption or use in industrial processing. The
Michigan regulations, for example, provide (p. 8): "Manufacturing, producing, and processing are divided
into three parts: 'administration,' 'production,' and 'distribution.' 'Administration' includes all adminis-
trative work such as general office work, all work relating to the administration of the business as a
whole, and all work that is performed prior to the time of the commencement of the actual mechanical
operations on the article to be manufactured, produced, or processed. 'Production' includes all operations
performed in the actual process of producing the manufactured article. 'Distribution' includes all operations
subsequent to production."
These problems are discussed in some detail, infra, pp. 350-352.
Who are customarily on duty a large number of hours per week, and whose wages, if increased
pursuant to the over-time provisions of the law, would be disproportionately raised.
4' So far as the writer has been able to discover from counselling members of the Michigan Manufac-
turers Association and from personal inquiry, little difficulty is met in paying productive workers time
and a half for overtime-many plants have long operated on this basis; and in all sections of the country,
the majority of productive workers receive wages above the statutory minimum. See Cooper, supra note 4,
at 54-56.
"2 In a recent letter, distributed in mimeographed form, March 6, 1939, the Division stated: "We are
not, at present, able to render an opinion on this question [whether a watchman, working at an operating
plant but employed and paid by an insurance concern or watching service company] of coverage of the
Act. This and related questions are under serious consideration .... In Interpretative Bulletin No. 1, p. 4
... we state our opinion to be that a watchman is engaged in the processes or occupations 'necessary to
the production of goods' and is, therefore, covered by the Act. This statement may be qualified by our
answer to your question above."
" If only employees performing work necessary to prevent stoppage of the actual productive processes
are covered, the difficulty of drawing a line is seen by attempting to decide which of the following jobs
are included, and which are excluded: stenographers, clerks in office, clerks in factory, inspectors who do
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tain the broadest possible realization of the declared Congressional purpose, will
doubtless induce the Wage and Hour Division to continue to urge a liberal interpre-
tation of the phrase "engaged in processes necessary to production"; yet it appears
that practical difficulties may induce the administration to concede certain relaxations
of the broad rule originally urged; and it is not at all unlikely that court decisions
may further restrict the effect of the phrase, to the end that eventually coverage may
be limited to those employees who are actually on the production line, or are engaged
in the performance of a job which must be done to keep the production line going.
B. Goods for Commerce
Employees engaged in processes necessary to the production of goods are entitled
to the benefits of the Fair Labor Standards Act only if the goods produced are "goods
for commerce." The extent to which this phrase will eventually be held to limit the
coverage of the Act depends largely on questions of constitutional law beyond the
scope of this article, and no more will be here undertaken than to suggest certain
points at which constitutional limitations may reduce the effectiveness of the Act.44
i. Where Employer Sells Part of His Goods on An Interstate Market.
Current trends toward decentralization of industry make this classification
probably the most inclusive.45 By making the touchstone the nature of the work of
the individual employee, Congress has extended the benefits of the Act to every
employee whose work is connected with the production of some goods that move on
an interstate market; regardless of the percentage of the goods manufactured in his
employer's establishment that are so marketed. If the constitutionality of this test is
established, the coverage will be much broader than under most federal laws enacted
under the aegis of the commerce clause. Prior laws, referring to the direct effect of
the employer's business as a whole on the flow of interstate commerce, excluded
many plants whose interstate sales, constituting but a small percentage of the total
output, were so small as to be insignificant, when viewing the nature of the em-
ployer's business. 46 By looking instead to the nature of the employee's work, the
field in which the Act operates is vastly broadened. While the conclusion seems
inescapable that the Act makes no distinction as to the percentage of the employer's
products (or of the goods on which the employee works) that move in interstate
not touch articles, inspectors who do, superintendents, foremen, watchmen, power house operators, first
aid attendants, tool crib men, truck drivers, equipment maintenance men, die try-out men, stcamfitters,
electricians, janitors.
"' Constitutional issues are dealt with in the opinions of Messrs. Stern and Smethurst at pp. 433 and
444 infra.
"5 While no completely satisfactory statistics are available, it appears that even most parts manufac-
turers, who sell products that are later to become incorporated as a part of another article, number among
their customers a substantial proportion who take shipments across state lines. It seems that most com-
panies whose sales are exclusively intrastate supply but a single customer, who is so closely identified
with the selling company that the two can be treated as one. C1. National Labor Relations Board v. Jones
& Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1 (1937).
"'This problem is more fully discussed, with reference to constitutional questions in my article, supra
note 4, at 35-45.
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commerce, the Administrator has buttressed his opinion to this effect by relying on
the legislative history of the Act, the President's message advocating the passage of
wage and hour legislation, the finding and declaration of policy in Section 2(a) (I)
of the Act, and the reference to "any goods" in Section 15(a) (i). 47
Of course, sometimes the destination of goods is not known until they have been
sold. While administrative convenience would be best subserved by a rule that the
residence of the ultimate consignee determined whether or not the goods were pro-
duced for commerce, yet this would produce unfair retroactive results-as in a case
where an employer, at the time the goods were produced, expected to sell the entire
output to a customer located within the same state, but later found it necessary to
dispose of a part of his stock out of the state. Recognizing this situation, the Adminis-
trator has ruled that whether or not the goods are intended for commerce depends on
whether the manufacturer at the time of production believes, or hopes, or has reason
to believe that the goods in production will move in interstate commerce.48 The
unexpected occurrence of some subsequent event is not retroactively significant. 49
2. Where Employer Sells All His Goods within the State to One Who Subsequently
Effects Interstate Distribution.
Where the stoppage does not affect the character of the goods, it seems fairly
predictable that the Act will be held to be validly applicable to the production of
goods sold within the state of manufacture to a vendee who effects interstate dis-
tribution thereof, whether the stoppage of the goods in the hands of the first vendee
be merely for reshipment or for storage.50 Clear it is that the Administrator makes
no distinctions based upon the length or character of the stoppage in the hands of the
intermediate consignee; he states bluntly, "It is immaterial that the producer passes
title to the purchaser within the State of production." 51
Where, however, the goods produced by the first employer are subjected to further
processing or manufacturing by the purchaser within the same State, constitutional
questions of grave import are at once encountered.52 The Administrator urges that
"I Interpr. Bull. No. 5, Dec. 2, 1938, I WAGE & HotrR REF. MAN. (1939) 74, 75.
48 Id.
S". . . if a shirt manufacturer produces shirts to fill the order of a local retail store in the expectation
that the shirts will be sold for consumption within the State of production, the manufacturer will not
become retroactively subject to the Act in respect to those goods, because the retailer subsequently goes
bankrupt and its whole stock of merchandise, including the shirts, is bought up by an out-of-State
merchant and removed to another State. On the other hand, if the shirt manufacturer produced the goods
to fill an out-of-State order, the rights of the employees under Sections 6 and 7 of the Act are not affected
by the subsequent fact that a fire destroys the finished shirts before they are shipped out of the State." Id.
" Cases are discussed in (1939) 52 HAtv. L. REv. 646, at 657.
" Interpr. Bull. No. 5, Dec. 2, 1938. It is interesting to note that in determining the applicability of
state sales tax laws, the situs of the transfer of title is often made the controlling factor. See Lockhart,
The Sales Tax in Interstate Commerce (939Y 52 HAxv. L. REv. 617.
'2 Under the doctrine of the Jones & Laughlin decision it seems that further processing by a subsidiary
of the original manufacturer does not create constitutional barriers. But in N. L. R. B. v. Idaho-Maryland
Mines Co., 98 F. (2d) 129 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938), it was held that the Wagner Act did not apply to a strike
at a coal mine where it appeared that all the gold there mined was refined by an independent purchaser
before shipment out of the State. This appears to be the only case involving an independent intermediary
under the National Labor Relations Act. Quaere, whether the persuasive power of this case is weakened
by the decision in Mulford v. Smith, 59 Sup. Ct. 648 (i939).
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the Act applies not only where the first product becomes an ingredient or an integral
part of the subsequent product, but even where the first product is merely a container
or label.53 Whether the production of a label becomes "the making of goods for
commerce" simply because the purchaser of the label subsequently affixes it to goods
manufactured by him and sold in interstate commerce, would seem doubtful, how-
ever, even as a matter purely of statutory construction and independent of constitu-
tional questions.
3. Definition of "Goods."
The problem last discussed lends significance to the problem of interpreting the
statutory definition of goods as "wares, products, commodities, merchandise, or arti-
cles or subjects of commerce of any character, or any part or ingredient thereof .... ,,"
It seems clear to the Administrator that the term includes "publications, pamphlets,
or any other written materials." '55 It would seem that a lawyer's brief, or an insurance
policy, might be goods, if reports of research agencies are held to be, as suggested by
the Administrator in the Interpretative Bulletin last cited. The ever-perplexing
problem of the distinction between sales and service contracts may thus arise in a
new setting. Coverage of the Act may be extended to non-manufacturing enter-
prises.5"
4. Segregation of Employee's Work.
While the Act creates a presumption of an employee's engagement in the produc-
tion of goods upon proof of his employment in a plant where goods shipped in
commerce were produced, 7 the Administrator has voiced the opinion 8 that the
Act does not require an employee who spends only a part of his time in the produc-
tion of goods for commerce to be accorded the benefits of the statute during all the
time that he works. If he works one week on goods destined for a local market, and
the next week on goods for commerce, his employment is subject to the provisions
of the Act only during the second week. But the Administrator does not permit
segregation between interstate and intrastate work during a single week, for the
reason that otherwise it would be easy to defeat the objectives of the Act by employ-
ing workers for 44 hours in the production of goods for commerce, and employing
them for additional hours during the same work-week, in the production of goods
to be sold locally, without increasing their rate of pay for the overtime hours.
III. EXEmPTIONS
While the clauses of the Act above discussed paved the way for administrative
freedom of action by defining in flexible and broadly inclusive terms what groups
n' Interpr. Bull. No. 5, Dec. 2, 1938.
' §3 (i), adding: "but [the term] does not include goods after their delivery into the actual physical
possession of the ultimate consumer thereof other than a producer, manufacturer, or processor thereof."
" Interpr. Bull. No. 5, Dec. 2, 1938.5 6Interpr. Bull. No. 6, Dec. 7, 1938, I WAGE & Hour Rav. MAN. (1939) 76. Some of the problems
arising in connection with the exemption of service industries are discussed infra p. 349.
"' §15(b).
" Questions and Answers, No. 9, Feb. 27, 1939, which warns that the Administrator has no power
to make definite rulings as to the coverage of the Act and that no opinion expressed by him will protect
the employer in the event of an employee suit.
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of workers were covered by the Act, a similar result is achieved through an opposite
technique in the exemption sections of the law. Here (except for some specific exemp-
tions established in favor of certain well defined classes of employees), the Act in
large measure delegates to the Administrator the power to decide what workers
should be exempted. This result is achieved through a simple device. Section 13 of
the Act declares that there shall be exempted from the provisions of the Act all
employees of certain classifications, as such classifications are defined by the Admin-
istrator.
Examination of the exemption sections is therefore of interest from two aspects:
first, because of the possibility (in view of the administrative interpretations above
discussed) that substantially all employees of companies doing an interstate business
are under the Act, unless they fall within one of the exempted classes; secondly, be-
cause the numerous regulations, interpretative bulletins, and letters published by the
Wage and Hours Division of the Department of Labor afford a timely example of
the administrative implementation of a somewhat barren statutory framework.
The exempting clauses of the Act may be divided into three classes: those grant-
ing exemptions only from the wage provisions of the Act; those granting exemptions
only from the hours provisions; and those granting exemptions from both wage and
hours provisions.
A. Exemptions from Wage Provisions
In the case of learners, apprentices, messengers, and handicapped workers, the
Act provides an exemption only from the wage provisions. The applicable exempt-
ing clauses59 are not self-operative; but merely authorize the Administrator, by
regulations and orders, to provide lower wages for these classes of employees, if he
finds such exemptions necessary to prevent curtailment of opportunities for employ-
ment. The exemptions become operative only upon the issuance of special certificates
by the Administrator. Detailed and explicit regulations have been issued, which
make the procurement of these certificates so difficult that during the first several
months following the effective date of the Act, not a single certificate for the employ-
ment of learners or apprentices had been issued, although many applications had
been filed.
Messengers and Learners. In the case of messengers and learners, the regula-
tions6 ° add significantly to the statutory background by providing that all applica-
tions will be considered and acted upon on the basis of the needs of the employees
and employers in any industry as a whole, rather than upon the basis of the needs
ro §14: "The Administrator, to the extent necessary in order to prevent curtailment of opportunities
for employment, shall by regulations or by orders provide for (i) the employment of learners, of ap-
prentices, and of messengers employed exclusively in delivering letters and messages, under special cer-
tificates issued pursuant to regulations of the Administrator, at such wages lower than the minimum wage
applicable under section 6 and subject to such limitations as to time, number, proportion, and length of
service as the Administrator shall prescribe, and (2) the employment of individuals whose earning capacity
is impaired by age or physical or mental deficiency or injury, under special certificates issued by the
Administrator, at such wages lower than the minimum wage applicable under section 6 and for such
periods as shall be fixed in such certificates."
0 29 CODE FED. REG., c. 5, Pts. 522, 523; I WAGE & Houn REF. MAN. (1939) 83, 84.
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of individual employees or employers in the industry.,' The regulations further
provide that on the filing of an application, a hearing will be had thereon, at which
the Administrator or his representative will decide, on the basis of testimony offered
by the applicant and that adduced by expert witnesses called by the Administrator to
advise him as to the need of issuing a certificate to prevent curtailment of employ-
ment opportunities, whether or not an exemption shall be granted. While it might
be feared that a judge who selects experts to advise him as to the facts of a case might
be disposed to rely too heavily on the opinions they give, the practical advisability of
such a procedure, to prevent the hearing on the application from being one-sided and
in effect ex parte, is quite apparent. It should be noted, however, that there is no
provision for appeal as of right to the Administrator from the decisions of the deputy
who conducts the hearing. The regulations permit an aggrieved applicant to peti-
tion the Administrator, requesting him to review the original determination; but the
Administrator may refuse to grant such petition for any reason he deems sufficient,
as if he is of the opinion that the findings of ultimate fact made by the deputy sup-
port the ruling, and are supported by the evidence adduced.
Indicative of the administrative attitude are the rulings made on the application
of a group of telegraph companies for messengers' certificates, and on the application
of pecan shellers for learners' certificates. In the former case, it was indicated that a
threatened discharge of employees of a particular company or companies will not
establish that a certificate is necessary in order to prevent curtailment of opportunities
for employment, unless the applicant shows that the employees involved would be
unable to secure other employment elsewhere.62 In the latter case, exemptions were
denied because of a finding that the employers could employ experienced pecan
shellers in sufficient numbers to meet labor requirements. 3 The implications of such
rulings, placing as they do upon the applicant a burden of proof which as a practical
matter is probably impossible to sustain, are portentous. They will probably dis-
courage employers from seeking exemptions, and thus, in actual practice, will extend
the effective coverage of the Act. Perhaps these considerations played some im-
ponderable part in the making of the administrative decisions.
Apprentices. A somewhat different approach is employed with reference to the
issuance of apprentices' certificates, which are issued (providing the Administrator
finds an apprenticeship is necessary in the trade involved) upon the filing of a joint
application, signed by both employer and employee, together with an authenticated
copy of a written apprenticeship agreement which has been approved by the State
Apprenticeship Council, and which provides for not less than 4,00o hours of reason-
ably continuous employment, and at least 144 hours per year of related supplemental
instruction.64
61 Within the last few days, however, it has been announced that henceforth granting of exemptioni
for learners will be on a plant basis. (1939) 2 WAGE & HouR REP. 261. New regulations concerning
learners are being promulgated currently.
62(1938) 3 LAB. REL. REP. 377. 6"I WAGE & Hous REF. MAN. (1939) 84.
29 CoDE FED. EG., c. 5, Pt. 521; I WAGE & HouR REF. MAN. (x939) 8i.
THE COVERAGE OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS AcT
Handicapped Workers. Similarly, in case of handicapped workers, the regulations
provide that upon receipt of a joint application setting forth in detail the nature of
the handicap and the necessity of authorization of employment at sub-minimum
wages to prevent curtailment of the employee's opportunities for employment, the
Administrator or his representative may award a certificate or make a further investi-
gation to determine what action should be taken. It is further provided that, except
on the basis of such investigation, no certificate will be issued authorizing employ-
ment of handicapped workers at less than 75% of the statutory minimum wage. 5
Messengers, learners, apprentices, and handicapped workers must be paid at one
and a half times their regular hourly rate of pay for overtime work performed by
them; the exemption granted them applies only to authorization of a sub-standard
hourly rate.
B. Exemptions from Hours Provisions
Another group of exemptions grant immunity only from the hours provisions of
the statute. In case of seasonal workers, some agricultural processors, employees
whose hours of service are controlled by the Interstate Commerce Commission, em-
ployees under approved annual wage agreements, and employees hired under ap-
proved collective bargaining agreements containing certain provisions relative to
hours worked, the exemptions afforded under the law authorize employment in ex-
cess of 44 hours per week without payment of one and a half the regular hourly rate
of pay for such overtime employment.
Seasonal Industries. The exemption for workers in seasonal industries is limited
in two ways: first, it is applicable only to workers in an industry which is found by
the Administrator to be of a seasonal nature (thus, under the plain language of the
statute, a finding by the Administrator is a condition precedent to the effectiveness
of the exemption); second, as to such workers, the exemption is applicable only for
periods not to exceed in the aggregate 14 weeks in any calendar year, and even during
the 14 weeks they must be paid time and a half for employment in excess of 12 hours
in any work-day, or for employment in excess of 56 hours in any work-week. 66
The regulations67 define a seasonal industry in terms which exclude any enter-
prise that is not compelled by conditions of nature to cease production except during
periodically recurrent intervals,6 s and thus seem to exclude all manufacturing indus-
tries, or substantially all. The Division has further indicated, through its general
counsel, that no single plant will be exempted even though it meets the definition of
a 9 CODE FED. REG., c. 5, Pt. 524; I WAGE & HouR RE . MAN. (1939) 9o.
06 §7(b).
7 9 CODE FED. REG., c. 5, Pt. 526; i WAGE & HouR REP. MAN. (1939) 54.
" The regulations provide that the exemption is applicable to "an industry which both (a) engages
in the handling, extracting, or processing of materials during a season or seasons occurring in a regularly,
annually recurring part or parts of the year; and (b) ceases production, apart from such work as main-
tenance, repair, clerical and sales work, in the remainder of the year because of the fact that, owing to
climate or other natural conditions, the materials handled, extracted, or processed, in the form in which
such materials are handled, extracted, or processed, are not available in the remainder of the year." I WAGE
& HoUR REP. MAN. (939) 55.
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"seasonal" as laid down by the Administrator. The exemption is granted only on the
basis of trades and industries that are seasonal.6 9
Further restrictions on this exemption were indicated by the ruling on an applica-
tion of certain lumber manufacturers. Despite a showing that the operations of cut-
ting, hauling, and pulpwood peeling were carried on under conditions which met the
administrative definition of seasonal, it was held that these enterprises did not con-
stitute separate industries, but were (regardless of unit ownership) merely subdi-
visions of the lumbering industry, which, taken as a whole, could operate throughout
the year. Therefore, and with the additional observation that enough employees were
available for work to permit operation of the industry even though the exemption
were not granted, the application was denied.70
Collective Bargaining Agreements. The provisions of Sections 7 (b) i and 7 (b) 2
of the Act, granting limited exemptions as to workers employed under certain types
of collective bargaining agreements, or annual wage agreements, can be discussed
together. An employer who hires workers on an annual basis, or on the basis of a
contract relating to a 26-week period, pursuant to collective bargaining agreements
made with employee representatives certified as bona fide by the National Labor
Relations Board, may obtain the right to average overtime over a period of time. If
such agreements provide that no employee shall be employed more than 2,0oo hours
in 52 consecutive weeks, or iooo hours in 26 consecutive weeks, an employee may be
required to work up to 12 hours in one day or 56 hours in one week, without pay-
ment of extra compensation for the overtime hours. These provisions may lead to
wider use of guaranteed annual wage contracts, since the Administrator has ruled
that the statutory exemption applicable to employees hired on an annual basis may
be availed of only if the employer guarantees either a fixed annual wage or annual
employment.71 On the other hand, where the worker is employed pursuant to an
agreement which provides that no employee shall be employed more than I,ooo hours
in any priod of 26 consecutive weeks, the employer need not guarantee continuous
employment or a fixed wage; and this type of agreement may be more attractive to
employers.7 2 The National Labor Relations Board will certify the employee repre-
sentative group as bona fide if any other local of the same union has already been
certified as a collective bargaining agent under the National Labor Relations Act,
unless cause to the contrary is shown 7 8 Adoption of either of these devices will
"Id. at 57.
'o The i2-page typewritten opinion in which this ruling was laid down proceeds with the closely-
reasoned formality of a judicial decision. The Wage and Hour Division appears to break cleanly away
from the often-criticized tendency of administrative tribunals to keep secret the reasons for their orders.
Since the writing of the text, the Administrator on reviewing this determination, reversed it to the
extent of holding that the pulp wood sap peeling branch of the industry, the ice ant snow road hauling
branch of the industry, and the spring freshet driving branch of the industry are of a seasonal nature.
71 Interpr. Bull. No. 8, Feb. 20, 1939, I WAGE & HoUR R.r. MAN. (939) 205.
aId.
'15The National Labor Relations Board has stated that an employee organization will be certified as
bona fide, for purposes of the Fair Labor Standards Act, under the following circumstances: (s) where
the labor organization has been certified by the Board as a collective bargaining representative of the
employees pursuant to §9 of the National Labor Relations Act; or (2) where the applicant is a local
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necessitate careful watching of employees' time cards, because the Administrator has
ruled that if the employer works such employees in excess of i,ooo or 2,000 hours,
during the period stated, he will become liable for overtime compensation (at extra
rates) to such employees for all hours which they worked in excess of 44 hours in
any work-week during the period. 74
Agricultural Processors. The hours exemption granted certain agricultural proc-
essors75 raises difficult administrative problems, which are still far from solution, in
connection with the administrative duty of defining "area of production." 6 Other-
wise, the statutory provisions appear to provide little source of interpretative difficulty.
Hours Fixed by Interstate Commerce Commission. The final exemption from the
requirement of paying increased compensation for overtime work applies (i) to any
employee with respect to whom the Interstate Commerce Commission has power to
establish qualifications and maximum hours of service pursuant to the provisions of
Section 204 of the Motor Carrier Act; and (2) to any employee of an employer
subject to the provisions of Part I of the Interstate Commerce Act.77
C. Exemptions from Wage and Hours Provisions
The most important exemptive provisions of the Act are those granting complete
exemption to the following twelve classes of workers: (a) executive and administra-
tive employees, as the class is defined and limited by the Administrator; (b) profes-
sional employees, as the class is defined and limited by the Administrator; (c) outside
salesmen, as the class is defined and limited by the Administrator; (d) employees
engaged in a local retailing capacity, as the class is defined and limited by the
Administrator; (e) employees of retail and service establishments, the greater part of
whose selling or servicing is in intrastate commerce; (f) certain aviators; (g) sea-
men; (h) fishermen; (i) employees engaged in agriculture; (j) employees engaged,
within the area of production (as defined by the Administrator) in preparing for
of an international or parent organization which has been certified by the Board as a collective bargaining
representative of the employees pursuant to §9 of the National Labor Relations Act; or (3) where any
local of an international or parent organization with which the applicant is affiliated has been so certified
as a collective bargaining representative pursuant to the National Labor Relations Act, such certification
shall be sufficient basis for certification of bona fides under the Fair Labor Standards Act, for any local
of the same international. I WAGE & HouR R . MAN. (1939) 57.
'4 Interpr. Bull. No. 8, Feb. 2o, 1 I WAGE & Housr REF.. MAN. (939) 205.
"§7(c) of the Act, providing: "In the case of an employer engaged in the first processing of milk,
whey, skimmed milk, or cream into dairy products, or in the ginning and compressing of cotton, or in the
processing of cottonseed, or in the processing of sugar beets, sugar beet molasses, sugarcane, or maple sap,
into sugar (but not refined sugar) or into syrup, the provisions of subsection (a) shall not apply to his
employees in any place of employment where he is so engaged; and in the case of an employer engaged
in the first processing of, or in canning or packing, perishable or seasonal fresh fruits or vegetables, or
in the first processing, within the area of production (as defined by the Administrator), of any agricultural
or horticultural commodity during seasonal operations, or in handling, slaughtering, or dressing poultry
or livestock, the provisions of subsection (a), during a period or periods of not more than fourteen work-
weeks in the aggregate in any calendar year, shall not apply to his employees in any place of employment
where he is so engaged."
'o The regulations on this point are undergoing current study by the Administrator; the treatment of
the problem appears to be in a state of flux. See various regulations, I WAGE & HouR REP. MAN. (1939)
11, 79, 81, r93. " §13(b).
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market agricultural or horticultural commodities; (k) employees of certain country
newspapers; (1) employees of street railways and motor bus carriers.
Executive and Administrative Workers. Regulations under the Walsh-Healey Act
afforded some grounds for anticipating that all employees might be deemed executive
or administrative workers whose chief function was to give, or to supervise the carry-
ing out of, general orders. Such expectations failed completely of realization. The
Administrator has ruled that under the Fair Labor Standards Act, only those em.
ployees fall within this class whose jobs possess all of the following six characteristics:
(i) management of establishment or customarily recognized department thereof;
(z) direction of work of other employees; (3) authority to hire and fire, or to make
recommendations carrying particular weight in these matters; (4) exercise of discre-
tionary powers; (5) compensation of at least $30 a week (exclusive of board, lodging,
or other facilities); (6) performance of no substantial amount of work of the same
nature as that performed by non-exempt employees.78 The last requirement has
proved particularly troublesome to employers, since many employees who have tradi-
tionally been deemed minor executives do a certain, amount of work somewhat
similar in nature to that performed by their assistants-a corporation treasurer, for
example, may set up work sheets as models for bookkeepers to follow. For adminis.
trative convenience, perhaps, and perhaps in compliance with a clearly indicated
administrative policy of going half-way in meeting and satisfying reasonable com-
plaints of employer groups, the Division (according to press reports) may change
the regulations on this point so as to define as "executive or administrative" any
salaried employee receiving more than $350 per month. Such action may be dictated
by Congress; several amendments are pending.79
Professional Employees. Possibilities that a color-matcher employed in the print-
ing ink industry might be a professional employee, and that conceivably a doctor or
attorney might not be, loom as the result of the somewhat puzzling definition of the
term "professional employee" promulgated by the Administrator pursuant to stat-
utory authority. 0 It would seem that perhaps a physician employed solely to
examine life insurance applicants, or an attorney employed to check transfers of
7I WAGE & Hous REF. MAz. ('939) 78.
"' It would seem that in the case of employees being paid such a salary for the performance of non-
manual work, the employees are paid for their ability to handle situations as they arise. Many such workers
have a comparatively light load for several weeks, and then face a situation which requires considerable
overtime work for several days, in order to keep things flowing smoothly; and it is fair to assume that
their salary is fixed in part at least in the expectation of such a work schedule.
" The regulations provide that a professional employee is one: "who is (a) customarily and regularly
engaged in work (i) predominantly intellectual and varied in character as opposed to routine mental,
manual, mechanical or physical work, and (ii) requiring the consistent exercise of discretion and judg-
ment both as to the manner and time of performance, as opposed to work subject to active direction
and supervision, and (iii) of such character that the output produced or the result accomplished cannot
be standardized in relation to a given period of time, and (iv) based upon educational training in a
specially organized body of knowledge as distinguished from a general academic education and from an
apprenticeship and from training in the performance of routine mental, manual, mechanical, or physical
processes in accordance with a previously indicated or standardized formula, plan or procedure; and
(b) who does no substantial amount of work of the same nature as that performed by nonexempt
employees of the employer." I WAGE & Hout REs. MA. (1939) 194.
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property in a register of deeds' office, might not fall within the requirements of the
definition, providing in part that professional work must be varied in character, re-
quiring judgment as to the time of performance, and of such a nature that the output
produced cannot be standardized in relation to a given period of time. On the other
hand, the Administrator recently advised that the color-matcher might be a profes-
sional employee.81
Outside Salesmen. Vendors of food-stuffs, who make recurrent routine deliveries
.(whether or not prior orders are placed by purchasers) or collections, are specifically
excluded from this exempt classification by the administrative definition, which other-
wise requires but little comment, providing as it does that outside salesmen are those
customarily and regularly engaged in making sales away from the employer's place
of business, who do no substantial amount of work of the same nature as that per-
formed by non-exempt employees of the employer.82
Those Engaged in Local Retailing Capacity; Employees of Retail and Service
Establishments the Greater Part of Whose Selling or Servicing is in Intrastate Com-
merce. While these sections, taken together, cover closely related fields, yet Congress
empowered the Administrator to define only the meaning of the first clause, "em-
ployees engaged in a local retailing capacity." 83 The meaning of "any retail or service
establishment the greater part of whose selling or servicing is in intrastate com-
merce" 84 is left to the courts for definition. The result may be a conflict. The Ad-
ministrator has defined the first class to include workers customarily and regularly
engaged in making retail sales the greater part of which are in intrastate commerce,
or performing work immediately incidental thereto, such as the wrapping or delivery
of packages, who do no substantial amount of work of the same nature as that per-
formed by nonexempt employees of the employer.85 The Administrator has made
his definition more specific through an Interpretative Bulletin suggesting a construc-
tion of the words "retail" and "service" establishments. While his interpretation of
the word "retail" is apparently binding as to employees engaged in a local retailing
capacity, it may be that the courts will interpret the same word otherwise in determin-
ing whether an enterprise is a retail establishment. In an Interpretative Bulletin8
relating to the meaning of the phrase "retail and service establishments," it is sug-
gested that retail establishments generally sell consumers goods in small quantities,
and that a company selling coal in large quantities to a manufacturer would not be
a retail establishment, while a company selling a few tons of coal to a householder
would be. It is further suggested in the Interpretative Bulletin that since retail estab-
lishments and service establishments are referred to in the same sentence of the Act,
the definition of service establishments should be limited to concerns of a sort gen-
erally associated with retail stores, such as restaurants and barber shops; and that
such enterprises as advertising agencies, banks, stock brokers, printers, investment
"1 Questions and Answers No. 9, Feb. 27, X939.
"2I WAGE & HoUm REF. MAN. (1939) 79. 83 §13(a).
84 Ibid. 85 I WAGE & HouR REF. MAN. 79.
88 Interpr. Bull. No. 6, Dec. 7, 1938; I WAGE & HouR REP. MANs. (939) 76.
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counsel, legal firms, accounting firms, and warehouse companies are not service
establishments. Apparently for purposes of administrative convenience, it is suggested
that in case of an organization engaging both in wholesale and retail selling, there
must be some physical separation between the wholesale and retail branches of the
business if the exemption is to apply. In determining whether or not the greater part
of the selling or servicing is in intrastate commerce, the Administrator suggests that
there should be considered the number of sales and gross income over a reasonable
period of time, typically three years.
Other Exempted Classes. Little comment is required with reference to the other
exempted classes of employees. The statutory definitions are comparatively specific,
and there is less delegation to the Administrator of power to write the law by de-
termining the limits of the classes involved. The exemption of seamen has been
interpreted8 7 as including those performing services rendered primarily as an aid in
the operation of a vessel as a means of transportation. The exemption for workers
employed in agriculture is pointed by the definition of farming (given elsewhere in
the Act)"" as including any practices performed on a farm in conjunction with farm-
ing operations. Apparently, maintenance workers and watchmen employed on farms
are exempted, 9 although workers performing similar jobs in factories (as above
pointed out) are deemed by the Administrator not to be excluded, but to be within
the Act. The exemptions of individuals employed within the area of production
engaged in handling, packing, storing, ginning, compressing, pasteurizing, drying,
preparing in their raw or natural state, or canning of agricultural or horticultural
commodities for market, or in the making of cheese or butter or other dairy prod-
ucts,90 creates the extremely difficult administrative problem, hereinabove alluded to,
of devising a practicable definition of "area of production." Other exemptions exclude
from the Act any employee of a carrier by air subject to the provisions of Title II of
the Railway Labor Act, employees engaged in various specifically defined branches
of the fishing industry, employees of a street, suburban, or interurban electric rail-
way, or local trolley or motor bus carrier; and employees engaged in connection with
the publication of a weekly or semi-weekly newspaper with a circulation of less than
3,ooo, the major part of which circulation is within the county where the newspaper
is printed and published.91
IV. DETERMINATION OF HouRs WORKED AND HouRLy RATE O1: PAY
Practical problems of considerable difficulty arise in connection with the determi-
nation of the number of hours worked and with the computation of the hourly rate
of pay. The Act was written with primary reference to hourly-wage employees; but
as it has been administratively interpreted it applies to many office workers who have
customarily been employed on a weekly or monthly salary which has been paid
without regard to the number of hours actually worked.
8 7 Interpr. Bull. No. ixi, April 29, 1939. " §3(f).
s' Questions and Answers, I WAGE & Hour REF. MAN. (1939) 96.
Do §13(a) io. 91 §13.
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Many employers who hire employees on a weekly wage and require them occa-
sionally to work more than 44 hours during a single week wish to adopt the most
practical and cheapest procedure available to assure themselves that they are com-
plying with the Act and with all the regulations issued thereunder.92
Such an employer often faces the problem of revising his pay-rolls so as to achieve
unquestionable compliance with the Act without prohibitive increases in his wage
costs. Suppose he hires several employees who are paid $40 for a 50-hour week. Each
such employee gets the equivalent of 8o cents an hour; his weekly remuneration is far
above the minimum contemplated by the Act (which will eventually be 40 cents an
hour for the first 40 hours and 6D cents an hour for additional hours of work in any
week). It would seem that the primary purpose of the Act could be fulfilled by con-
tinuing such an employee on the payroll at his weekly wage of $4o.93 This was the
interpretation which apparently was first placed upon the Act by the Administration
-in October, 1938, Associated Press articles quoted authorities as announcing un-
officially that a worker employed on a flat weekly salary might be worked more than
44 hours a week without increased pay, provided his total earnings were not below
the minimum requirements of the law.94 More recently, however, it has been offi-
cially ruled that this cannot be done. The regulations require time-and-a-half for
overtime, regardless of the rate of pay or basis on which wages are computed. An
employee receiving $4o for a 50 hour week would be deemed to be paid at the rate
of 8o cents an hour, and the regulations require that his weekly wage be increased
to $42.4o ($.8o x 44 plus $i.2o x 6).91
It would seem that the most practical expedient for the employer is to change such
"' Indicative either of a general acceptance of the purposes of the Wage and Hour Law, or possibly of
a resignation to federal control of business practices, is the fact that employers with whom the writer has
had contact have expressed a desire to comply in all respects with the statute; and, even though grave
doubts existed as to applicability of provisions of the Act to certain of their employees, have treated all
of their employees as being subject thereto.
"This, of course, raises the broad question as to what the real purpose of the Act is. While the
Congressional declaration of policy in Section 2 declares the policy of the Act to be that of correcting and
eliminating labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of minimum standards of living necessary for
health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers, many believe that an equally fundamental purpose
of the Act is to induce work-sharing. While the latter may be a practical concomitant of the Act, it
would seem that the officially announced purpose may properly be regarded as the true intent of the
legislation.
" Much interchange of opinion and comment has been indulged in this connection. On Sept. 29, 1938,
the Administrator is reported to have stated, in reply to a question asked at the conclusion of a speech
given by him in Birmingham, Ala., that a minimum wage law is the floor of the very lowest wage to
be pegged, and that the law did not contemplate establishment of several minimum wages within a single
plant. Associated Press releases of Oct. 20, 1938, stated in part: "This is the unofficial advice which some
wage-hour authorities have given in response to inquiries: ... A worker now employed on a flat weekly
salary might be worked overtime without increased total pay by regarding his hourly rate as being at a
lower figure." John C. Gall, General Counsel for the National Association of Manufacturers, issued an
opinion which in general reached a somewhat similar result. I WAGE & HoUR REF. MAN. (1939) 59, 6o.
The Administrator replied, stating that the Wage and Hour Division did not agree with Mr. Gall's opinion.
Id. at 6o, 61. The subject is discussed in an editorial in the New York Times of Tuesday, Oct. 25, 1938.
" Similarly, the average hourly rate of a piece-worker is computed by dividing his piece-rate earnings
for a week by the number of hours worked during the week, and theq paying a bonus for those hours
in excess of 44. 29 Cona FED. REG., c. 5, PLt 516; I WAGE & Hour R.EF. MAN. (939) 105; Interpr. Bull.
No. 4, Oct. 21, 1938, I WAGE & Hour RiF. MAN. (1939) 54.
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employee's basis of pay to 76 cents an hour. Then, paying time-and-a-half for over-
time, his total weekly earnings (if he worked 50 hours) would be $40.28 ($.76 x 44
plus $1.14 x 6) or approximately the same as they had been under the original flat
weekly rate.
While counsel for the Wage and Hours Division have warned that this practice
is not authorized by the Act,96 the writer submits that it is not prohibited by the Act;
and, further, that it complies both with the letter and with the spirit of the law.
True, Section 18 provides in part that, "No provision of this Act shall justify any
employer in reducing a wage paid by him which is in excess of the applicable
minimum wage under this Act"; but the wishful language of this section (which was
at one time termed by the Administrator to be nothing more than a "pious hope"
on the part of Congress) by its own terms applies only to reductions of wages. It
does not refer to changing the method by which wages are computed. The procedure
suggested does not result in a reduction of wages-the employee receives the same
weekly wage as before, if he does the same amount of work. Indeed, in the example
given, the employee's wages are increased 28 cents a week. Further, the essential
legislative purpose-assuring a living wage for a short week's work-is not defeated.
If the employee referred to wished to work only 44 hours a week, he would still
receive $3344.
V. CONCLUSION
Perhaps the chief practical defect in the coverage provisions of the Act is that
because of constitutional limitations the law can have no application to thousands
of employees (in retail stores, barber shops, restaurants, hotels, other retail and service
establishments, and small factories operating exclusively intra-state) who probably
constitute the largest class of underpaid workers.97 There is a real need for further
state laws, requiring payment of a fair day's wages for a fair day's work, and
restricting or prohibiting employment in excess of the maximum number of hours
consistent with health and efficiency.98
" See excerpts from speeches, I WAGE & HouR REF. MAN. (939) 62, 63; cf. Interpr. Bull. No. 4, Oct.
21, 1938, I WAGE & HouRs REF. MAN. (1939) 54.
"' This situation is discussed in some detail in the writer's article cited, supra note 4, at 54 et. seq.8 These ends can of course be achieved by laws that do not incorporate the work-sharing philosophy
inherent in the Federal Act. Prohibition of employment more than an average of nine hours a day or
54 hours a week in certain industries, and a minimum rate of pay of 25 cents to 35 cents an hour, without
retention of the device of requiring extra pay for hours worked in excess of a minimum devised otherwise
than on health-conservation principles, would accomplish the declared purpose of Congress.
